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Abstract 
 Society is living in fear of catastrophic climate scenarios, the so 
called Anthropogenic Global Warming (AGW) theory. It is a multi-
disciplinary subject; this paper analyzes the psychology behind such thinking 
which is governing the perception and politics of the subject. It does this in 
so-called Game Theory decision tables for people's thinking. We come to the 
conclusion that current opinion in society will shift from 'active believer' to 
'passive believer' to 'active non-believer' if evidence against AGW will 
continue to accumulate.  
 
Keywords: Climate change, global warming, psychology, beliefs, game 
theory, Pascal’s wager. 
 
1 Introduction 
Predicting the end of the world has always been popular. That is well 
explained by Dawkins’ Meme: An idea in society can survive and propagate 
because the host (the society) is receptive to it. Society is receptive to 
catastrophic ideas because the individuals are receptive to them, as will be 
discussed in this paper. While this idea is nothing new, we present here a 
numerical analysis in so-called decision tables.  
Anthropogenic Global Warming (AGW) is not the first and will not 
be the last catastrophic model. Even if all of the previous ideas have been 
proven wrong, there is always room for new ones. Remember: Y2K 
(a.k.a. Millennium Bug), ozone, acid rain, H1N1, etc. The ideas go even 
further back. Christian religion has a history for predicting the end of the 
world; they name it Armageddon. Other religions and religious-like 
philosophical schools follow suit. Religions are overrepresented in this 
subject, because religion, by definition, is about believing things. Evidence is 
not needed for catastrophe ideas.  
A summary of 170 documented end-of-world apocalyptic predictions 
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can be found on Wikipedia (Wikipedia 2013 c). There probably exists a 
multiple of this number of undocumented predictions. Some predictions are 
very time-exact. One even to the millisecond, namely the Millennium Bug 
(Y2K), an apocalyptic scenario that would take place when the computer 
calendar year changed from 99 to 00 in the year 2000. (Hence the name 
Millennium Bug, for being exactly one year before the end of the second 
millennium). Other scenarios were also rather exact, but were corrected by 
the prophets after not materializing at the first predicted date. The Ig Nobel 
Prize of Mathematics of 2012 was awarded to a set of people that predicted 
the end of the world, some of them repeatedly.  
However, the most successful predictions, those that more easily 
propagate and survive in society, are those that are not ’exact’ at all. It is still 
the firm belief of many Christians that one day Armageddon will come, 
although the exact day is not well known (a large number of predictions on 
the above-mentioned list are of this type). This way the catastrophic-scenario 
meme (CSM) can exist longer, it can be recycled over and over again, there 
where exact-date end-of-world memes become naturally extinct when their 
validity has expired.  
This list shows that having apocalyptic thoughts is very normal to the 
human mind. Apocalyptic weather ideas are also nothing new. Noah’s Ark is 
probably the most famous, but weather and cosmological (e.g. comets) 
events have always been seen as signs of the gods – e.g. the Nordic god Thor 
as the source of electric storms – and indications of bad times ahead. It is 
also not uncommon to attribute human influence on the weather and the 
climate. While mostly detrimental (the gods punishing mankind for its sins 
through the weather), also positive weather action is believed to be possible, 
with Native American rain dances probably the most famous example.  
Generally speaking, pessimistic thinking – punishment for sin – is 
part of the human soul, and the weather does not escape from this 
phenomenon. As such, the AGW models are simply the result of how the 
human psyche works, and we should not be surprised about the conception 
nor the perseverance of these ideas in society. While the planet indeed has 
warmed up, the attribution to human behavior is dubious, but this attribution 
flows naturally from the human way of thinking. What the evolutionary 
psychiatrist J. Anderson Thomson describes as ”We have a great deal of 
difficulty seeing anything other than human causation” (Richard Dawkins 
2007). In other words, we have a need to explain everything as ’caused by 
humans’. Applied to climate changes: ”It must be human-caused”. In our 
seemingly rational society, believing is apparently still prevalent.  
And any scientific analysis of the problem is met with extreme 
skepticism by the believers. Readily a conspiracy theory is invented to 
explain why the rest of the world is not believing the same things. The non-
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believers are for instance normally accused of being paid by oil companies 
(But why should oil companies care about oil? They’ll apply money where 
profit can be made and are in fact the largest investors in renewable 
energies). There is no room for a conspiracy anywhere, but it is invented 
anyway.  
In his book ”The Empire of Conspiracy”, Timothy Melley explains 
that conspiracy theories are prevalent in society and are not limited to a tiny 
minority of lunatic ’psychopaths’ (Melley 2000). Interestingly, Melley gives 
as an example how 37% of the American people believe Global Warming is 
a hoax. This deriding comment shows that Melley lives his own proof, since 
believing that AGW is true makes him a paranoiac person, steadfastly 
believing in a human-caused climate ’conspiracy’, while for sure he has 
never seen any evidence to prove such claims. (He would not believe in them 
if he did understand the poor science behind such models).  
The analysis can be extended and, apparently, many people even 
believe in contradictory conspiracies, which is possible because reason never 
entered into it anyway. As an example, according to Wood, many believe 
there is a conspiracy that Osama Bin Laden was already dead when his 
assassins entered his mansion, as well as that he is still alive (Wood, 
Douglas, and Sutton 2012). (Some kind of Shrödingers cat being both alive 
and dead at the same time). Both facts being hidden from the people 
somehow in this conspiracy. Wood is fully right. Climate-conspiracy 
believers readily accept that the human-caused climate change causes Europe 
to both warm up and cool down (Liu et al. 2011). In fact, anything is readily 
seen as proof of the conspiracy. That is how the mind works. The more 
evidence is accumulated that the climate actually is on a cooling path, the 
more this must be proof of the conspiracy, and anything is believed to avoid 
the unpleasant cognitive dissonance. So, cooling down of our planet now is 
seen as evidence of a Global Warming (AGW) scenario. In fact, any weather 
event is seen as evidence for AGW. Global Warming is now being marketed 
as Climate Change to the general public. In this way, by being a vague 
theory, no fact whatsoever will technically ever be able to scientifically 
debunk the ideas.  
This is a form of what Leon Festinger called ’cognitive dissonance’ 
in 1957 (Festinger 1957): A strong desire of people to keep things simple 
and to eliminate any dissonance if two cognitions are inconsistent, just to 
make sense of things. ”It was discovered in a participant observation study of 
a cult which believed that the earth was going to be destroyed by a flood, and 
what happened to its members when the flood did not happen. While fringe 
members were more inclined to recognize that they had made fools of 
themselves and to ”put it down to experience”, committed members were 
more likely to re-interpret the evidence to show that they were right all along 
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(the earth was not destroyed because of the faithfulness of the cult 
members)” (McLeod 2008). This kind of behavior we now see in the ’cult’ 
of climate investigators. Their beliefs are so strong that opposing facts are 
actually seen as proof. Unprecedented appearance of icebergs in front of the 
coast of Australia is an example (Malkin 2013).  
As a technical background information, to put things in perspective, 
in the 2007 IPCC report, it was concluded that the world had been heating up 
in an accelerated way by about 0.8 degrees in the 20th century and that the 
heating was fully caused by human activity, with natural variations 
maximally only of the order of 0.2 degrees. The famous Hockey Stick 
presented as proof. See for instance Fig. 2.5 on page 40 of the IPCC 2007 
report (Ref. (IPCC 2008)). Given the fact that human detrimental activity has 
not abated, there was ”no room for doubt” in the models – none whatsoever 
– that the planet would heat up further in the future. In reality, the planet has 
cooled down since 1998 and this scientifically invalidates – falsifies – the 
models. However, in a Bayesian (i.e., non-scientific) way, the model was 
adjusted, the error margins increased, and the cooling down called a ’pause’ 
in 2013. The belief in the ideas is so strong that facts seem to be ignored or 
treated with skepticism, even by scientists. Facts can no longer invalidate the 
theories and only belief remains. It shows all symptoms of cognitive bias 
(See Yudkowsky for the ten most important (Yudkowsky 2008)), things that 
prevent you from being rational. Mostly, the research suffered from what is 
called ’confirmation bias’ (Nickerson 1998) which basically means looking 
for evidence of the hypothesis (Yudkowsky 2008), where science entails the 
opposite, falsification of hypotheses (Chalmers 1982). Science uses 
debiasing techniques (such as double-blind and triple-blind research most 
famous from the fields of pharmacy and psychology, areas where bias would 
otherwise be pervasive). As far as we know, no such techniques were ever 
used in climate research – we don’t even see how that would be possible – 
and absence of cognitive bias can therefore not be guaranteed and is 
therefore even likely, since the research is performed by humans with all 
their cognitive errors.  
The list of cognitive biases goes far beyond the ten given by 
Yudkowsky (Yudkowsky 2008). Many are strongly related to each other or 
even contradicting. A sheer infinite list can be constructed. We mention here 
some relevant ones that might be applicable to the belief in AGW (these 
biases are not the subject of study of this paper, but are given here as 
background in psychology):  
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 The belief in a catastrophic scenario is generally termed ’pessimism 
bias’, the tendency of people, especially those suffering from 
depression, to overestimate the likelihood of negative outcomes. 
Contrasting, also ’positive bias’ exists, which is exactly the opposite 
effect: being optimistic that negative scenarios will be unlikely to 
happen.  
 Festinger’s cognitive dissonance effect mentioned above is generally 
called the ’backfire effect’, people react to disconfirming evidence by 
strengthening their beliefs (Nylan and Reifler 2010).  
 A phenomenon that can also easily be recognized is the so-
called ’irrational escalation’ or ’escalation of commitment’, which says 
that people justify increased investment in a decision, based on the 
cumulative prior investment, despite new evidence suggesting that the 
decision was probably wrong (Staw 1976).  
 ’Negative bias’ is the tendency to pay more attention to negative 
information than to positive (e.g., weather disasters) (Sanderson 2009).  
 ’Gambler’s fallacy’, is the tendency to think that future probabilities 
are altered by past events, when in reality they are unchanged (O’Neill 
and Puza 2005). After repeatedly ’heads’ coming out when flipping 
coins, the estimated probability of ’tails’ is increasing. In 
contrast, ’hindsight bias’, basically means to predict the past and is a 
complete area of science in itself: In so-called empirical forecasting it 
means copying the found parameters of the past (such as average and 
spread of the data) for a prediction of the future. After 
repeatedly ’heads’ coming out when flipping coins, the estimated 
probability of ’tails’ is decreasing. This effect thus always results in 
mere extrapolation of trends (as has always been the case in the history 
of climate research). It basically works like this: if temperature has 
gone up (down), and X seems to be the only thing that changed during 
this time, inevitably a model will be developed that explains the rise 
(drop) with agent X being responsible, and future increases of X will 
without doubt cause more rise (drop). The definition of empirical 
forecasting. The Black Swan theory is the real occurrence that a 
beautiful explanation was developed why swans must be white, and 
then a black swan was found when Australia was discovered (Taleb 
2010).  
 ’Illusionary correlation’ (Chapman 1967), inaccurately perceiving a 
relationship between two unrelated events. In AGW, the forward 
relation between CO2 and temperature is perceived, there where the 
data actually hint at a reverse cause-and-effect relation, i.e., the CO2 
lags behind temperature by about a thousand years (Indermühle et al. 
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2000; Stallinga and Khmelinskii 2014a).  
 The ’ludic fallacy’, a term coined by Taleb (Taleb 2010), is assuming 
nature is working in a probabilistic way (like ’throwing dice’ all the 
time), and thus follows laws of statistics, which isn’t necessarily true 
(Stallinga and Khmelinskii n.d.).  
 The ’curse of knowledge’ is the effect that knowledge of a topic 
diminishes one’s neutrality in the subject (Camerer, Loewenstein, and 
Weber 1989). Climatologist, cannot but think there is something wrong 
with the climate.  
 ’False consensus effect’. The tendency of people to overestimate how 
much other people agree with them (Wikipedia 2013 a). This is 
actually more than a psychological effect, but is data distortion. The 
consensus in AGW among (climate!) scientists was estimated to be 
97% (Cook et al. 2013). Yet, this consensus does not represent the true 
level of agreement between people, but instead is a direct effect of the 
positive feedback of the peer-reviewing publishing system: 1) Referees 
are randomly taken from literature (more papers published, more 
chance of being selected for refereeing), 2) referees, victim of their 
cognitive biases like anybody else, tend to ignore scientific reasons and 
are inclined to accept more readily papers proving their beliefs than 
disproving them (and, the age-old question arises: Who controls the 
controllers? Apparently nobody. There are serious problems with peer-
reviewing (Bohannon 2013)). Even if the effect is tiny, this makes that 
if ’belief A’ has a slight advantage over contradicting ’belief B’, B will 
be filtered out completely in a Darwinistic way, and in a society where 
it is publish or perish, people representing B are soon without a job 
altogether (Stallinga and Khmelinskii 2015). Related to it is what can 
be called the ’queue effect’ (Stallinga 2010). Imagine a hundred people 
standing in ten queues. That is, one queue with 91 people and 9 queues 
with one person. Ask the hundred people what is their queue length, 
and you will find an ’average’ queue of 82.9 people, while the ’real’ 
average is 10.0. In other words, observations from within the system 
give different results than external observations. ”Yes, we, from our 
belief, all agree with each other” are the only words uttered and found 
in literature. A false consensus.  
 ’Expectation bias’ and ’selection bias’, or ”trust your model, facts can 
be disposed of”, the tendency to select data that prove a theory and 
throw away data that disprove it. This is made famous by the 
ClimateGate scandal (Climategate 2013), and the effect of constructing 
a Hockey Stick by selecting proxies that prove AGW (and ignoring 
ones that are not consistent with it) (Loehle and McCulloch 2008). 
Generally the ’Semmelweis reflex’, the tendency to ignore correlations 
European Scientific Journal October 2016 edition vol.12, No.29  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
433 
or to reject new evidence that contradicts a paradigm.  
 ”With ’sanctification bias’, members of a particular group, be it 
political, economic, philosophical, or religious, believe (without 
supporting, demonstrable evidence that can be statistically confirmed) 
that their group is somehow favored; that they know ’the truth’, that 
others are ignorant and want to attack that truth, and that any 
disagreement is because the ’others’, the outside world, is inherently 
flawed, or evil, or misguided. Throughout all of history, the people 
committing the worst, most horrific acts have almost always believed 
they were somehow sanctified, providing mental protection as to the 
consequences of their behavior on humanity.” (Kennon 2013)  
 ’Availability heuristic’ is the inclination of people to take readily-
available information easier into a model of the world than hard-to-get 
data. In a positive feedback system, this can then lead to ’availability 
cascade’, which is described by Nobel-Prize-winning Daniel 
Kahneman (Kahneman 2011) in his book ”Thinking, fast and 
slow”: ”An availability cascade is a self-sustaining chain of events, 
which may start from media reports of a relatively minor event and 
lead up to public panic and large-scale government action”. The media 
report was the article in Scientific American of Roger Revelle (Revelle 
1982) in 1982 writing his pessimistic outlook on the climate to justify 
research grants, triggering the response of Nobel-Prize winning 
politician Al Gore. Kahneman continues: ”On some occasions, a media 
story about a risk catches the attention of a segment of the public, 
which becomes aroused and worried. This emotional reaction becomes 
a story in itself, prompting additional coverage in the media, which in 
turn produces greater concern and involvement. The cycle is 
sometimes sped along deliberately by ’availability entrepreneurs,’ 
individuals or organizations who work to ensure a continuous flow of 
worrying news.” In this we can easily recognize the IPCC, thriving on 
the fear of climate change, which they then set out to prove. Without 
AGW, the panel would cease to exist. Kahneman: ”The danger is 
increasingly exaggerated as the media compete for attention-grabbing 
headlines. Scientists and others who try to dampen the increasing fear 
and revulsion attract little attention, most of it hostile: anyone who 
claims that the danger is overstated is suspected of association with 
a ’heinous cover-up.’ The issue becomes politically important because 
it is on everyone’s mind, and the response of the political system is 
guided by the intensity of public sentiment. The availability cascade 
has now reset priorities. Other risks, and other ways that resources 
could be applied for the public good, all have faded into the 
background.” Indeed, people dampening the worries are accused of 
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working for oil companies (as part of the cover up), voices are being 
heard that ’denying’ AGW should be punishable by law as strong as 
denying the Holocaust. Now, three decades after the start of the idea, 
governments all over the world are implementing measures that are 
costly and that moreover have no significant effect on CO2. 
Unfortunately, politicians are now hindered by the ’escalation of 
commitment’ mentioned above and there is no longer a possibility to 
keep them in check, since the populace at large is whipped into a 
frenzy and actually demands more measures from the politicians. 
Apparently, there is no limit to the availability cascade and can even 
reach pan-global economy-wrecking proportions. 
 
Non-believers can be accused of some of these same cognitive biases 
as well. And they even have their own. For instance the ’omission bias’, the 
tendency to judge harmful actions as worse than equally harmful inactions; 
in doubt, we prefer to do nothing. Actually, the opposite bias also exists (”It 
is better to do the wrong thing than to do nothing”, Churchill). Or 
the ’normalcy bias’, the refusal to plan for a disaster which has never 
happened before until it happens (and immediately ’hindsight bias’ kicks in).  
 The ’ostrich effect’ (ignoring a possible negative 
situation). ’Hyperbolic discounting’ is the tendency of people to have 
stronger preference for more immediate payoffs relative to later payoffs i.e., 
have a near horizon, ignoring catastrophes that are possible far away in 
time. ’Reactance’ is the urge to do the opposite of what someone wants to 
do, to not feel constrained in freedom of choice. We know we should do 
something to change the climate, but we prefer to choose to do nothing.  
Finally, any researcher, including the authors of this paper, could 
actually possibly be accused of having a ’bias blind spot’, the tendency to see 
oneself as less biased than other people. In fact nobody can be certain of not 
suffering from it. Assuming to be immune to bias is misplaced arrogance.  
Continuing, the difficulty of being falsified makes AGW a very 
powerful catastrophic-scenario meme (CSM). A successful CSM is surviving 
in society if it cannot easily be refuted by facts. Refutable CSMs will not 
survive and will be replaced by ones that can percolate and survive in 
society. Even if eventually the facts overtake the models of AGW and prove 
them wrong, in the meantime there is always some Bayesian re-adjusting of 
the predictions possible. This is a phenomenon we now see taking place in 
our society. The cooling-planet fact is bent 180 degrees to again be proof of 
the ideas. However, the selling of the idea that cooling is also AGW has not 
caught on so well, and a cooling planet will sooner or later make people 
abandon this CSM. The best prediction for the climate is a cooling until 2055 
and we might well wind up a full degree below current averages (and three 
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degrees below IPCC predictions) (Khmelinskii and Stallinga 2010). It is 
interesting to study when and how the mentality of the people on this subject 
will change. For that we define here a framework for the mental state of 
people, to make predictions of people’s behavior in future.  
In summary, the Global Warming meme is classical doomsday 
thinking and has all the properties of a successful version: It is catastrophic, 
it has a human cause, any prediction can be Bayesian adjusted (what is called 
retrodiction), and contradictory ideas are ignored or even incorporated into 
the ideas (to avoid cognitive dissonance). Moreover, by ’biased 
assimilation’, information supporting the belief is accepted/incorporated 
more readily than information undermining it (or saying it in another way, 
people with a certain belief will more readily accept information that 
supports that belief than people who do not have that belief) (Hamilton and 
Stampone 2013). For instance, a year with relatively many tornadoes is seen 
as proof of AGW by its adherents, while subsequent years with less than 
average tornadoes are ignored. Or melting of polar ice is accepted more 
readily as a truth by AGW believers than by non-believers.  
 
2 Results and discussion 
We have studied this phenomenon of the AGW meme a little further 
and tried to determine what goes on in the heads of people that believe in the 
AGW scenario. This finding seems to be applicable to any CSM but 
specifically in AGW, since it is in our opinion of the type heaven-as-reward, 
as summarized by Blaise Pascal: ”I do not know whether God exists, but I 
know that I have nothing to gain from being an atheist if he does not exist, 
whereas I have plenty to lose if he does. Hence this justifies my belief in 
God”. We extend this idea here. It is based on the presence of fear and 
anxiety.  
Of course, there can be other reasons why people believe things, 
apart from Pascal’s Wager. While this paper is not about believing in itself 
and we do not criticize such a stance, we would like to mention here some 
alternative reasons why people might believe things.  
The most obvious is ’evidence’; people believe things by seeing 
facts. ”Seeing is believing!” (For instance, if the axiom of the laws of gravity 
can explain the trajectories of planets, these observed and predicted 
trajectories make us believe in the axiom). However, as discussed above and 
shown by Nylan and Reifler, this often backfires; Facts contradicting 
someone’s belief actually in many cases strengthen it (Nylan and Reifler 
2010). ”The general idea is that it’s absolutely threatening to admit you’re 
wrong”, according to Nylan. One of the strongest arguments heard for the 
existence of God is that He is not showing His presence (”Why is He not 
interfering if he is so almighty and benevolent? He is testing you!”).  
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 Likewise, people find proof for conspiracies (”hidden agendas”) 
exactly by the fact that they are not visible. The erasure of evidence is part of 
the thing believed and therefore ’no evidence’ is dialectically reversed 
into ’evidence’. Generally speaking, there is a huge difference between 
acquiring a belief and (Bayesian) adjustment of it (Dietrich and List 2012). 
Still, it seems reasonable to assume that exposure to facts can change a 
belief, and we expect AGW opinion to change if contradicting facts become 
available. As an example, once the public gets wind of the fact that in history 
the CO2 was always lagging behind the temperature variations – a fact that 
scientifically falsifies the theory of AGW; there is no way whatsoever to 
explain this in the framework of AGW – we may expect that it will change 
its belief. It will then rapidly become fashionable to adopt an anti IPCC 
stance.  
A simple reason why people might believe things is that they have 
evolved into a predisposed attitude of believing it. It is like asking, Why do 
people have black hair? While deferring the question how the mechanism 
works, apparently having a predisposition for a belief gave them a higher 
survival rate in the gene pool. Natural selection took care of the rest. One 
might even ponder over what it is that makes believing things profitable in 
terms of reproduction, but it seems obvious that adopting a popular opinion – 
basically following fashion – leads to more success than going against it.  
Moreover, copying a belief of someone else saves a lot of energy. So, 
it makes sense that having a predisposition for copying fashion, including 
any fashionable belief, is advantageous and therefore it exists.  
People can believe something because it pleases them. I can believe that I am 
beautiful. It would make me happy being beautiful or at least believing so. I 
like being happy, so I make sure that I believe that idea of me being 
beautiful.  
People can believe things from ’inertia’ or ’tradition’ as it is 
commonly called, ”Our people have always believed X”. That means never 
actually having thought about the subject. And a successful propagation of 
the belief in society is therefore accomplished by installing it into young 
people at an as early age as possible, because a once-acquired belief is 
difficult to lose, and the social effect of ”my society believes X, therefore I 
feel good believing X too, to feel part of society” is maximized. (Note: AGW 
teaching packages endorsed by the UNESCO exist for primary schools for 
this exact purpose (UNESCO 2013)). Another reason might be ’denial’ 
(applicable to an already existing belief), the technique ”to avoid the panic 
[cognitive dissonance] that would come from realizing things are not as you 
believed” (Kennon 2013). There are actually people denying AGW. (Note: 
Skeptics do not deny anything). Similar to denial is calling the source of 
disproving evidence a ’false prophet’ (for example Antichrist, or calling 
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AGW-skeptics ’Deniers’); a way to ”avoid unpleasant emotional side effects 
of cognitive dissonance is to shut out all opposing evidence by labeling any 
counter-evidence as malevolent” (Kennon 2013).  
A strong effect is self-delusion, ’believing in one’s own lies’. What 
started as a lie, by repeating it can make the liars themselves start believing 
in it. ”The salesman always buys his own sales pitch”. Especially politicians 
have long been known for this effect of self-deceit. That is because in their 
own world, the political arena, it is of utmost importance to appear 
convincing. The ability to fully believe in whatever is said is obviously a 
winning trait. Anyone not having this quality is soon eliminated from the 
political arena. Actually, social recognition enhances this self-deception. ”In 
1976, when Ronald Reagan was running for president of the United States, 
he often told a story about a Chicago woman who was scamming the welfare 
system to earn her income. [..] He talked about this woman, who he never 
named, in just about every small town he visited, and it tended to infuriate 
his audiences. The story solidified the term ’Welfare Queen’ in American 
political discourse and influenced not only the national conversation for the 
next 30 years, but public policy as well. [The story] wasn’t true.” (McRaney 
2015). The advent of social media exacerbated this effect which researchers 
call ’digital amnesia’.  
Yet, the most self-consistent (philosophically solid) reason for 
believing is ’faith’. It is basically to believe to believe; any attempt to use 
reason and finding a justification ’why’ or ’why not’ is met with skepticism, 
because it is not sticking to the faith of the belief. As Martin Luther 
commented, ”Reason is the biggest enemy that faith has”. Once a belief has 
been installed, it is kept without ever going back to questioning it, not 
questioning it actually being part of the belief. In terms of evolution, it is 
energetically favorable for a species to believe to believe, to not waste 
energy in constantly questioning things. This is the anti-scientific stance; 
science’s only task is constantly questioning things.  
This gives immediately firm ground for another reason for believing, 
namely ’induction’. A person believes something, because it is the logical 
result of other things already believed. People saying ”I believe X because it 
makes sense” is of this type. If I believe wood burns, and that trees are made 
of wood, I believe – ”it makes sense” – that trees burn; I do not need to see 
them burn to believe it.  
Another strong reason is ’authority’. Believing something an 
authority says, because it is the authority, so is assumed to know about the 
subject. ”In the Roman Catholic Church, the pope is the most important 
person and people believe he must be right because he is the pope” (R. 
Dawkins 2013). Likewise, the fact that the climate message comes primarily 
from a pan-global political institute (The IPCC of The United Nations) 
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makes it more credible in the eyes of people.  
A reason very much related to it is that people trust other people that 
they deem to be knowledgeable, the ’expert opinion’ effect. To give an 
example, 69% of people in a survey of Edelman trust academic or expert 
sources, and only 36% trust government official or regulator sources 
(Edelman 2013). Trust is commonly the relationship between pupil and 
teacher, the former fully trusting the latter and copying his or her beliefs.  
However, this effect is masked by the Dunning-Kruger effect – 
unskilled individuals suffer from illusory superiority, mistakenly rating their 
ability much higher than average (Wikipedia 2013b) – which then makes 
people (especially stupid ones) fall back to their beliefs and calling the 
knowledge of others stupid. ’Stupidity’, defined as ’not knowledgeable’, the 
estimation of the wisdom of others is then done in a self-referential way; A 
certain person is evaluated to be intelligent if he or she has the same beliefs. I 
can say ”My neighbor is a plumber and when he says I should use half-inch 
pipes in my house, I trust him”, copying him – believing him – in an area 
where I have no prior knowledge nor opinion. However, if my neighbor with 
a PhD in climatology says that there is no AGW (against my beliefs), I will 
ignore his opinion, and on top of that call him stupid or question his 
motivation (”He is paid by oil companies!”) exactly because he has another 
opinion, and my dislike for cognitive dissonance forces me to assume he 
must be stupid. As Ronald Bailey paraphrases it in his blog, ”Everyone who 
knows what they’re talking about agrees with me. And everyone who 
doesn’t, wears a tin foil hat” (Bailey 2013), summarizing a study of Kahan et 
al. that had as starting point the question ”Why do members of the public 
disagree – sharply and persistently – about facts on which expert scientists 
largely agree?” (D. Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, and Braman 2011). In other 
words, the expert-trust effect does not work for a subject where we already 
have a strong belief – where we already made up our minds – because we 
use to estimate the level of intelligence and evaluate the statements of a 
person in the same time. In fact, trust in scientists (on the AGW subject) is 
waning, from 32% in 2007 to 26% in 2013 (Clement 2013).  
Interestingly, the Dunning-Kruger effect also stipulates that 
people ”recognize and acknowledge their own previous lack of skill, if they 
are exposed to training for that skill” (Wikipedia 2013b), which is why 66% 
of people need to hear things repeatedly (3 to 5 times) to believe something 
(Edelman 2013). This gives an excellent way for the scientific community, 
aware of its need to do so, to cause a shift in public opinion. In view of the 
(believed) urgency of the subject of AGW, it is justifiable, or at least 
understandable, that people spend effort on changing the beliefs of others. 
An effective tool in this respect is then alluding to a ’consensus’. 
People are generally convinced into believing AGW by the idea of there 
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existing a consensus. Either by direct argument of social intimidation (”Who 
am I to think different than so many people?”), or by hearing more often 
news in favor than against a certain belief and thereby being trained to 
embrace it. Consensus (Cook et al. 2013) is actually the most-often-heard 
argument to convince the people, while we all learn in school that consensus 
itself is never a scientific argument. One researcher actually calls it 
the ”heroic story of the consensus in AGW” (Reusswig 2013), a sentimental 
observation that is, once again, lamentable, but understandable. He also 
reveals a political agenda by stating ”We – as scientists – will have to 
explain to policy makers ... that risks and uncertainties will grow”. 
Politicians sometimes even make quasi-religious statements – that is, 
Lutheran comments – such as that of Ereaut and Segnit, ”The task of climate 
change agencies is not to persuade by rational argument ... Instead, we need 
to work in a more shrewd and contemporary way, using subtle techniques of 
engagement ... The ’facts’ need to be treated as being so taken-for-granted 
that they need not be spoken. Ultimately, positive climate behaviours need to 
be approached in the same way as marketeers approach acts of buying and 
consuming ... It amounts to treating climate-friendly activity as a brand that 
can be sold. This is, we believe, the route to mass behaviour change” (Ereaut 
and Segnit 2006). This sort of wording, if known by the public at large, 
actually may put the cause at risk. Even more so when we read, ”This work 
was commissioned by the Institute for Public Policy Research as part of its 
project on how to stimulate climate-friendly behaviour in the UK”. People 
readily will start seeing conspiracies and will lose trust in their leaders. 
Another researcher, Rudman, writes, ”Our hope is that researchers 
will design persuasion strategies that effectively change people’s implicit 
attitudes without them having to suffer through a disaster” (Rudman, 
McLean, and Bunzl 2013). Note, ’persuasion strategy’ is a euphemism 
for ’(mind) conditioning’ or ’brainwashing’. (The choice of words depends 
on your point of view) (Lectures on how people can design persuasive 
strategies exist and can for instance be found on readwritethink 
(Readwritethink 2013)). Indeed, politicians do have an (open) agenda, 
namely changing the beliefs of people in order to change their behavior, 
something that is believed necessary. A consensus in literature has been 
heroically established for this purpose and the effects are visible in society 
(but apparently not enough yet, considering the lackluster acceptance of the 
ideas. 64% of Americans do not think Global Warming is a threat in their 
lifetimes; Addressing the economy has highest priority, AGW only on the 
8th place; While 69% think the Earth is warming, only 42% think it is mostly 
because of human activity (Clement 2013)). All psychological techniques are 
used. As an example, the consensus is not presented as ”(with 100% 
probability) the planet will heat up x degrees”, but instead ”with 95% 
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probability, the planet will heat up x degrees”, which makes use of the 
importance amplification effect called ’affect heuristic’ (Yudkowsky 2008). 
(Apparently people believe the scenario more readily when presented with 
probabilities instead of as a certainty). We can conclude that there is a need, 
a driving force, and an effort to change the opinion of the people.  
Yet, even so, an anti-correlation between intelligence and believing 
things exists. An example was shown by Lynn, et al. (Lynn 2008). They 
showed that the belief in God diminishes with I.Q. Below an I.Q. of 80, 
nearly everybody believes in God, above 100 it rapidly drops and by 
interpolation it can be shown that by a level of about 110 the belief is 
basically absent. And by extrapolation the all-knowing wise person with an 
infinite I.Q. then knows God does not exist. (This reasoning was used to 
ridicule extrapolation as an effective tool (Stallinga 2010)). In the belief in 
AGW we can see the same effect; an increased literacy diminishes the belief 
in man-made climate changes (D. M. Kahan et al. 2012; Hamilton 
2009), ”Members of the public with the highest degrees of science literacy 
and technical reasoning capacity were not the most concerned about climate 
change” (D. M. Kahan et al. 2012). Interestingly, the actual weather also has 
a strong impact on people’s AGW beliefs; obviously belief getting stronger 
after warm spells of weather and weaker after cold spells (Hamilton and 
Stampone 2013; Rudman, McLean, and Bunzl 2013; Deryugina 2013). This 
is an example of ’hindsight bias’, modeling the future based on experience of 
the past (Yudkowsky 2008), combined with ’availability heuristic’, a 
proximity effect where close-by – ’fresh’ – data have more weight in the 
modeling than stale data.  
Coming back to our main contribution, the basic idea we present here 
is that people make an expectation-value probability-distribution analysis in 
their heads similar to concepts used in Game Theory. It is as follows: AGW 
can in the end be correct or can be false. A person can believe in it or not. 
There are thus 4 possibilities in total: Person X believing in it while it is true, 
believing in it while it is false, not believing in it while it is true and not 
believing in it while it is false. Each, in the head of the test person, has a 
probability, but also a final reward. This reward occurs during life, or can 
also be after-life if the person believes in that. Note that it can also be 
negative, i.e., punishment. And this immediately shows the similarity with 
other religious beliefs. As an example, a person not believing in heaven 
during life, will go to hell after life, and this hell is a punishment place, i.e., 
negative reward. ”Better to be safe than sorry” and believe in heaven.  
Now, an ignoramus, somebody that knows absolutely zilch about the 
climate, will be inclined to believe these ideas. For the simple reason that the 
expected yield is higher when believing in them. That because the rewarding 
is highly asymmetric. See the decision table presented in Table 1. In this 
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table a ’good citizen’ behavior (having believed in AGW which was true) is 
eventually rewarded by 10 moral coins. (The numbers are rather arbitrary, 
but serve to make our point clear). Similarly, we can attribute a 10-coin 
reward to a good behavior of not having believed in erroneous, silly models. 
 It can be argued that this reward is actually much less than 10 
(nobody ever gets rewarded for adhering to a non-belief), but for the sake of 
simplicity we will attribute symmetric rewarding for correct believers, since 
for the moment anyway it does not make much difference if rewards for 
correct believing are symmetric or not. The punishment for wrong believing, 
however, is dramatically asymmetric. For people who erroneously believed 
in AGW, there is as good as no punishment. A mere shrugging of the 
shoulders and going on with life. ”No harm’s done”. A payment of one 
moral coin. (Imagine the similar case of having believed in a heaven that 
turned out to not exist; by definition there is no reward whatsoever, 0, for 
lack of an entity to receive it). On the other hand, not having believed 
something that turned out to be true is severely punished by 1000 moral 
coins, the equivalent of eternally staying in hell. 1000 coins is probably an 
underestimate. And a punishment, -1, for AGW adherents is also an upper 
estimate. Actually, they will eventually say ”... but we have learned a lot”, 
turning it into a positive reward anyway. But that happens after the theory is 
debunked and thus does not enter into the heads at this moment and is not 
part of this psychology analysis. We assume a tiny punishment here for 
wrong believers.  
Table 1: Ignoramus 
 X believing * X not believing probability 
AGW true +10  -1000  50%  
AGW false -1  +10  50%  
Expected reward 4.5  -450   
*: winning strategy 
 
An ignoramus, for not knowing anything of the subject, will assume a 
50-50 probability between the two scenarios. As can be seen, the high 
asymmetry between the expected punishments for people that erred will then 
shift the balance towards believing. ”In the survey of a random sample of 
1,045 adults aged 18 and up interviewed April 2013, 63 percent said they 
believe global warming is happening” (UPI 2013). (Note the word ’believe’; 
for sure, not even 1% of these 63% has studied the subject in some detail and 
can make an educated estimate of the probabilities involved). None of them 
knows anything about the subject, but the risk of it being correct and the 
moral punishment associated with it makes people lean towards believing. 
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 This is further amplified by the social effect that people want to 
belong to the group and repeat what is socially dictated to them. There are no 
anti-AGW prophets or institutes, and no anti-AGW doctrine to adhere to, so 
the social effects against believing are minimal; there is no anti-AGW social 
network. However, no social aspects are analyzed here, but only 
individualistic behavior decision tables.  
Actually, the table needs a third column, ”believing and acting”, 
convincing other people of the faith gets a multiplication of the rewards, see 
Table 2. Like the prototypical Jehovah’s Witnesses acting and annoyingly 
knocking our door (or UNESCO’s AGW-teaching packages, or the political 
mind-steering programs mentioned before). Try to see it from their point of 
view (that is, decision table). The stake is upped by their behavior. Maybe 
tenfold, the wrong believing now gets a punishment of -10 (being considered 
annoying by the rest of society), but imagine the possible reward if correct, 
saving souls ... at least 100 moral coins, if not more. It further distorts the 
asymmetry towards believing, +45 versus -450. Including an active anti-
AGW stance column in the table with an equal multiplication of the stakes 
by a factor of ten will create the final decision table as presented in Table 2. 
It is obvious that an active AGW stance is the winning strategy for an 
individual ignoramus (+45 expected yield). The worst is an active anti-AGW 
stance (-4500 expected yield).  
Table 2: Passive or Active Ignoramus 
 X believing X believing X not believing X not believing probability 
 Active *  Passive  Passive  Active   
AGW true +100  +10  -1000  -10000  50%  
AGW false -10  -1  +10  100  50%  
Expected reward +45  +4.5  -450  -4500   
*: winning strategy 
 
A wise person can study the climate and can get a better estimate of 
the probabilities. This sounds easier than it is, because who will pay for this 
study? Why should somebody do that? A good – but ignoramus – citizen will 
not easily part with money to be used against the current belief, the moral 
reward being higher if action is taken in favor of the belief and reduced if 
effort is spent on contradicting it, as shown above. In this setting, it is 
difficult to study the subject in true objectivity. It is much easier to just ride 
the waves and make a career in a related field and then, if the theory is 
debunked, to ”... have learned a lot”. Play on the safe side. For instance, 
study the local nature with a justification of climate change and then, AGW 
turning out to be wrong or not, the knowledge anyway being useful for 
science and society. This is the psychological approach of nearly all of our 
colleagues. It is an opportunistic stance.  
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And even if an educated person will find that AGW is ”probably 
false”, this person will continue to bet on it, see the decision table for an 
academic person that more-or-less knows the models are flawed with 95% 
certainty (Table 3). However, as can be seen, no longer a pro-active stance is 
rewarded better than a passive stance, -4.5 vs. -0.45. The amount of climate 
fanatics is indeed much smaller in the academic world. See for instance the 
Oregon Petition, a petition to urge politicians to abandon disastrous climate 
policies (Petition n.d.). This petition has tens of thousands of academics 
subscribing it, including many PhDs and engineers. This number is 
staggering and overshadows the number of members of the official political 
intergovernmental panel on climate change (IPCC) which is estimated to be 
about 2500. Similarly, a Manhattan Declaration on Climate Change presents 
the worries of a large number of scientists of all fields (Declaration n.d.). All 
in all, it is obvious that among academics, the adherence to AGW ideas is 
minimal, but it is also obvious that these scientists are by far not as well 
organized. For the moment, that is.  
Table 3: Passive or Active Academic 
 X believing X believing X not believing X not believing probability 
 Active  Passive *  Passive  Active   
AGW true +100  +10  -1000  -10000  5%  
AGW false -10  -1  +10  +100  95%  
Expected reward -4.5  -0.45  -40.5  -405   
*: winning strategy 
 
The more educated a person is, and the more this person realizes the 
errors in the AGW thinking, the more the balance is shifted towards passive 
believing in the models, up to a point where actually non-believing becomes 
more ’lucrative’ and eventually even a pro-active anti-AGW stance becomes 
the optimal strategy. We can expect a change of mentality in society when 
the proof against AGW becomes so overwhelming that no longer an AGW 
belief is the optimal choice and, aided by the social effect that paying climate 
research stops to be considered ’paying the devil’, rapidly more proof is 
accumulated and the balance shifts towards an active stance, an individual 
trying to convince people that AGW is erroneous. For the decision table 
presented, the shift from believing to non-believing is nearly immediately 
accompanied by switching from a passive to an active stance, because the 
interval of probabilities where a passive non-believing stance is winning is 
tiny, namely only when passively not believing has a reward from about -1 to 
0. (In this numerical example it occurs when the AGW has a probability 
between 0.99% and 1.07%). The switch to active non-believing occurs when 
non-believing has an expectation value that is positive. That is, for the 
rewards presented, when the probability is less than about 0.99%. From that 
European Scientific Journal October 2016 edition vol.12, No.29  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
444 
moment on, suddenly in society everywhere people will pop-up that say that 
they always thought the AGW models were nonsense. That is also amplified 
because now the sociological effect works against the AGW beliefs, where it 
before worked in favor of them. Figure 1 summarizes this table as a function 
of probability (in people's heads) of AGW being true.  
To summarize up to this point: with changing probabilities, due to 
accumulating evidence against AGW, we can expect a shift in society from 
predominantly ’active believing’, where all media and politicians jump on 
the bandwagon (current state), to ’passive believing’, where people don’t 
seem to care much and where it is not high on the agenda of politicians, to 
(immediately) ’active non-believing’, where (the same) politicians will now 
advocate climate ’sense’.  
We have personally studied the AGW scenario in depth and have 
written several papers and reports on the subject (Stallinga 2010). Our 
estimation is that AGW is very likely incorrect. A passive stance in our 
opinion is then not possible, as follows directly from the tables presented 
above; if the expected reward gets positive, it immediately gets even more 
positive for an active stance that has a multiplier effect. We could be accused 
of being an example of our own decision-tables analysis. 
 
Figure 1: Expectation value of reward for the four stances towards AGW for an ignoramus 
(50%) to an academic (Table 3 presents the values for the 10% case). As can be seen, for 
accumulating evidence against AGW, the public stance will switch from active believing 
(ignoramus, 50%), to passive believing (for instance at 10%) to (nearly immediately) active 
non-believing at around 1%. The inset with a zoom-in of the low-probability zone makes 
this clearer 
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Moreover, we even studied the effects of measures combating climate 
change and came to the conclusion that the estimations of the reward 
parameters are gravely wrong (here, and in people’s heads). The punishment 
for adhering to a false AGW belief is severe, much more severe than that for 
erroneously not believing it. Implementing anti-climate-change measures 
will cause death and misery for billions of people, while fighting climate 
change symptoms is a triviality and has as good as no human cost. In fact, 
rising temperatures and increased atmospheric carbon-dioxide concentrations 
are beneficial for plant growth and food production, as has been shown over 
and over again in history. All heydays of civilizations occurred at relatively 
high temperatures, evidencing the beneficial effects of warmer climate. The 
effect of carbon-dioxide is demonstrated by the fact that a lot of crop in 
moderate-climate areas is grown in greenhouses where CO2 is injected into 
the air, not to increase the green-house effect, but to stimulate plant growth, 
in a method called CO2-fertilization. 
This we can call the skeptic stance, since most climate skeptics think 
this way. Their decision table is summarized in Table 4, from where we can 
see that an active anti-AGW stance is the optimum strategy for an educated 
skeptic that has a good estimation of probabilities and rewards.  
Table 4: Skeptic 
 X believing X believing X not believing X not believing probability 
 Active  Passive  Passive  Active *   
AGW true +100  +10  +10  +100  5%  
AGW false -10000  -1000  +100  +1000  95%  
Expected reward -9495  -949.5  +95.5  +955   
*: winning strategy 
 
Scientists use another ’decision table’ in their heads. Because, for a 
scientist, there is absolutely no moral harm in being wrong, as long as you 
have used the Scientific Method. There is no ’reward’ for being right or 
wrong. It does not matter if at the end things are correct or not. What matters 
is that you did not believe things at all – in the above text, ”X not believing 
AGW” in fact is ”X believing not-AGW” – but used systematic research and 
rigorous discussion of ideas and scientific deduction in trying to find out the 
truth. The probabilities do not enter into it. They are completely irrelevant, 
see Table 5. A citizen can be worried about the state of the planet and its 
future. A scientist never is. Or as Einstein said it, ”Anyone who thinks 
science is trying to make human life easier or more pleasant is utterly 
mistaken.” Einstein, who got a Nobel Prize for the photoelectric effect. 
Something that Millikan tried to scientifically prove wrong all his life, an 
effort that also gave him a Nobel Prize. We have summarized the Scientific 
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Method recently in another publication (Stallinga and Khmelinskii 2014b). 
We are well aware that the true scientific stance is very rare indeed.  
Table 5: Scientist 
 
X believing  
(AGW or not-AGW) 
X not believing 
anything * 
Probability 
 
AGW true -1000  +10  x  
AGW false -1000  +10  100%-x  
Expected reward -1000  +10   
*: winning strategy 
 
3 Conclusion 
To summarize, we have presented here some kind of numerical 
analysis to show what is going on in people’s minds. Why are people often 
quite fanatic about a thing they know little about? The less they know, the 
more fanatic they seem. Note that we did not include calculations beyond the 
ignoramus (50%) mark because most people that we know that advocate 
AGW, are of the type ”It is possibly true, and the consequences would be too 
severe to not act on this hypothesis” (in other words, exactly our ignoramus 
decision table, see Table 2). We know of no people that think that AGW is 
likely (more than 50%) true. (If people say that they believe that it is very 
likely true, it is because they are taking an active stance). Nothing changes in 
the 50%-100% region anyway, where an active stance remains optimal.  
We have no idea whatsoever how one can determine the exact probabilities 
and, even less, the reward parameters in the tables. We present the ideas here 
only phenomenologically. The only thing that is important, though, is that 
there is a punishment (negative reward) for wrong beliefs and that this 
punishment is asymmetric, as in typical CSMs. As long as that is in the 
heads of people, the behavior will be as explained.  
We would like to challenge our colleagues from statistical 
psychology to find a way to determine the exact parameters used here, since 
it can give a hint at how, when and how fast public opinion will shift in 
society. Yet, it seems unavoidable that public behavior will shift from 
believing directly to active non-believing, if facts continue to accumulate 
against the ideas. Interestingly, it seems in the last years the storm of pro-
AGW news items has abated, from which we infer that the first step has 
already been taken, namely from active believing to passive believing. We 
predict a flow of anti-AGW news items in the near future.  
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